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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2542 
___________ 
 
ABDUS SHAHID, 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF DARBY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-00533) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 1, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 22, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Abdus Shahid appeals from the order of the District Court dismissing his amended  
complaint.  We will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I.      
  Shahid is a United States citizen of Bangladeshi origin who owns various 
properties in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.  He has filed several lawsuits under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that various municipalities have discriminated against him on the 
basis of his national origin.  In one such suit, he claimed that the Borough of Darby 
discriminated against him by issuing numerous citations regarding a ten-unit warehouse 
building that he purchased in 2006.  The District Court entered judgment in the 
Borough’s favor following a bench trial, and we affirmed.  See Shahid v. Borough of 
Darby, 560 F. App’x 152 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 The complaint at issue here concerns the same warehouse.  In 2015, Shahid filed a 
complaint pro se under § 1983 alleging that the Borough of Darby was preventing him 
from leasing all ten units of the warehouse in order to “punish” him for his national 
origin.  Shahid claimed, among other things, that one of his tenants set fire to the 
warehouse in January of 2015 and that the tenant was an “agent” of the Borough.  Shahid 
also claimed that another tenant caused extensive damage to another unit.  On the 
Borough’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the District Court dismissed Shahid’s 
complaint without prejudice to his ability to file an amended complaint alleging with 
specificity how the Borough had harmed him. 
 Shahid then filed an amended complaint.  This time, Shahid omitted his previous 
allegations regarding the Borough’s alleged involvement in the fire and the damage to 
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another unit.  Shahid claimed instead that the Borough:  (1) failed to approve any rentals 
after the date of the fire; (2) condemned the entire property even though the fire damaged 
only two of the units; (3) prevented him from performing maintenance on the property; 
(4) refused to arrest someone who stole pipes and other materials from the property; and 
(5) gave unspecified letters to two tenants to assist them in court proceedings that Shahid 
brought against them.  The Borough filed a motion to dismiss Shahid’s amended 
complaint as well, and the District Court granted it and dismissed the amended complaint 
with prejudice.  Shahid appeals.1 
II. 
 A § 1983 claim premised on discrimination/denial of equal protection requires a 
showing of purposeful discrimination.  See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 
247, 273 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015).  In this case, the District 
Court concluded that Shahid failed to state a plausible claim that the Borough 
discriminated against him and that further amendment would be futile.  We agree.   
Shahid’s amended complaint contains only one specific allegation that even  
                                              
1 We exercise plenary review of the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), and we 
review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  See Burtch v. Milberg 
Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must “allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the 
factual pleadings allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted).  “This 
standard requires showing more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.”  Id. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). 
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arguably raises an inference of discrimination.  Shahid alleges that the Borough 
condemned his property in January of 2015 and prevented him from renting any of his 
ten units, but that “[p]revious American born landlord rented as many units as possible.  
Thus, Darby Borough’s discriminatory policy or custom caused the underlying 
constitutional violation.”  (ECF No. 7 at 1 ¶ 4.) 
The District Court concluded that Shahid did not raise a plausible inference of 
discrimination because the former “American born landlord” was not similarly situated.  
In particular, the District Court noted that the previous landlord owned the property 
before the fire leading to the condemnation, and it concluded that damage caused by 
another tenant as alleged in Shahid’s initial complaint contributed to his inability to lease 
units as well.   
Shahid appears to challenge the District Court’s reliance on allegations contained 
only in his initial complaint.  That challenge is well-taken in part,2 but it is immaterial.  
Shahid’s amended complaint and the materials attached to his response in opposition to 
the Borough’s motion to dismiss continued to refer to the fire that he alleges prompted 
the condemnation.  Thus, the mere fact that a previous American-born landlord was able 
to lease more units does not raise any inference that the Board had or exercised any  
                                              
2 The District Court expressly considered allegations contained only in Shahid’s initial 
complaint. (ECF No. 10 at 6 n.6.)  Shahid’s amended complaint, however, superseded his 
initial complaint.  See W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 
712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, the District Court should not have considered 
allegations contained only in the initial complaint in assessing the sufficiency of the 
amended complaint at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.  See id. at 172-73. 
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discriminatory animus toward Shahid.   
Neither do any of Shahid’s other factual allegations.  Shahid alleges, for example, 
that Borough police refused to arrest someone whom Shahid claims stole various items 
from his property even though he identified the suspect.  Shahid attributes that refusal to 
Borough President Janice Davis, whom he claims met with police before he did.  Shahid 
alleges, however, that “what she told police supervisor plaintiff do not know.”  (ECF No. 
7 at 4 ¶ 13.)  Shahid also alleges that the Borough condemned his entire property even 
though an engineer’s report stated that the fire damage was limited to only two units.  
Shahid, however, has not alleged anything about these circumstances that raises 
any inference of discrimination.  These allegations aside, Shahid’s allegations of 
discrimination are entirely conclusory, and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  See Burtch, 662 F.3d at 225.  Finally, Shahid does not argue 
that the District Court should have given him leave to further amend, and nothing in 
Shahid’s filings in the District Court or this Court suggests that doing so would be 
anything other than futile. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
